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Abstract: One of the main philosophical problems of quantum mechanics is un-
derstanding in what manner Schödinger’s wave function can said to be real. In this 
paper I explore the ways in which the Aristotelian notion of potentiality could be 
used to understand the reality of the wave function, as suggested by Heisenberg in 
some of his writings. For this reason I sketch some of the potential complications in 
the interpretation of wave function while trying to develop Aristotle’s philosophy of 
potentiality in relation to quantum mechanics. I will also attempt to demonstrate 
the connections of Popper’s account of propensities with the notion of potentiality.
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Resumen: Uno de los principales problemas filosóficos de la mecánica cuántica 
es comprender de qué manera la función de onda de Schrödinger puede decirse 
que es real. En este artículo exploro el sentido en que la noción aristotélica de 
potencialidad podría utilizarse para entender la realidad de la función de onda, 
tal y como sugirió Heisenberg en algunos de sus escritos. Por esta razón trato 
algunas de los posibles problemas en la interpretación de la función de onda a la 
vez que intento desarrollar la filosofía de la potencialidad aristotélica en relación 
con la mecánica cuántica. También intentaré demostrar las conexiones entre las 
propensidades tal como las propone Popper y la noción de potencialidad.
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1. Introduction
The birth and development of quantum mechanics in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s brought about various problems that questioned our compre-
hension of nature, and specifically the interpretation of high mathematical 
formalism that seemingly leads to a probabilistic theory. One of the main 
problems concerning quantum physics is how to interpret Schrödinger’s 
wave function and the way it describes the physical world. In the foun-
dational period of quantum mechanics there was a wide debate concer-
ning which kind of reality we should attribute to the physical notions of 
“particle” and “wave” and how we should understand them in order to do 
physics. It seems that wave function describes the evolution of the quantic 
system, but it implies, among other problems, that there is a superpo-
sition of electron states before the observer measures a property of the 
system with some experiment2. Hence it is difficult to know for certain if 
the electron can be understood as a particle or as a wave, and which kind 
of reality corresponds to the wave function. On the other hand, it does not 
seem possible to say that quantum mechanics is just a mathematical for-
malism that must be interpreted as a probabilistic theory without referen-
ce to reality. In that case we would have to say that quantum mechanics 
tells us nothing about the world, but can only be used as a tool to make 
predictions. However, it seems strange that such a precise mathematical 
formalism is not describing something real3.
In the following pages I will atempt to approach these problems 
in a realistic way. Assuming that the wave function describes something 
real, the question is therefore to know what kind of reality we are talking 
about when we apply the term real to the wave function. As I will try to 
show, this problem is connected with the question of the determinacy or 
indeterminacy in quantum physics.
In order to resolve these problems I will explore the Aristotelian 
notion of potentiality which, as a comprehensive tool, can help us to find 
an intermediate level of reality between being and not-being. Although 
this use of the term potentiality was suggested by Werner Heisenberg in 
2. See Dirac, P.A.M.: The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 
pp. 34-36.
3. “I personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as a real 
thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical calculations. For it has the character of 
an invariant of observation; that means it predicts the results of counting experiments, and 
we expect to find the same average numbers, the same mean diviations, etc., if we actually 
perform the experiment many times under the same experimental condition. Quite generally, 
how could we rely on probabilty predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something real 
and objective?. Born, M.: Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1949, pp. 105-106.
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order to explain the collapse of the wave function, I think that a deeper 
reflection could also help to understand in which way we can say that the 
wave function is something “real”. In this sense Popper’s “propensity in-
terpretation” of quantum mechanics is close to a potentiality/act interpre-
tation of the physical world. As D’Espagnat pointed out, the Aristotelian 
notions of “potentiality” and “materia prima” could have an interpretative 
role to play in quantum mechanics, but it is necessary to reformulate them 
in a more precise way4.
2. Historical approach to the problem of the wave function
As Jammer pointed out, the main problems to accept a totally rea-
listic interpretation of the wave function (ψ) are that:
ψ is a complex function
ψ undergoes a discontinuous change during a process of 
measurement.
ψ depends on on the set of observables chosen for its representation, 
for example, its representation in momentum space differs radically from 
its representation in position space5.
The wave function does not describe a particular event, but rather 
a range of possible events, and in its equation we find complex numbers 
that cannot describe something real at all (√-1). If the wave function is 
just a probability of knowledge, it could be said that it is just a theoretical 
(mathematical) model that helps to make predictions. However, it seems 
that the wave function, although describing a probability, it is also 
something real, or rather is describing some real properties of the physical 
world: otherwise it would make no sense its high predictive capacity.
Since Max Born interpreted the wave function in terms of 
probability, the question about realism/idealism and determinism/
indeterminism has led to the emergence of different interpretations. The 
Copenhagen interpretation, which has been the most accepted among 
scientists, understands that there is a limit in our knowledge of reality, 
and it is not possible to define all the properties of the system, because 
when the observer makes an experiment there is a collapse in the wave 
function that alters it and “forces” the electron to manifest at one located 
point. Why does the electron appear at one or another particular point? 
According to the Copenhagen interpretation the reason would be the 
4. See D’Espagnat, B.: On Physics and Philosophy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006, p. 459.
5. Jammer, M.: The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. New-York: Wiley-Interscience, 1974, 
p. 33.
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indeterministic character of the quantum world. As a result the wave 
function helps to make predictions, but it is not possible to predict the 
result of the experiment in a totally precise way, because there is some kind 
of indetermination in the behaviour of the electron. The fact of subjecting 
the photon or the electron to an observation forces it entirely into one of 
its possible states, but the result of the observation cannot be predicted 
at all, since we can only know the possible states through a probability 
law�. Moreover, there seems to be a superposition of states previous to 
the observation by which any particle can be made to exhibit interference 
effects with itself. 
One of the main interpretations of the Copenhagen school is Bohr’s 
principle of complementarity. As he stated repeteadly6, the notions of 
“wave” and “particle” shouldn’t be seen as contradictory. Moreover, we 
need to use them as complementary notions in order to make science. It 
seems that in Bohr’s view there is no possibility of finding a reasonable 
solution to the wave-particle duality and, as a result, we should put aside 
the question of whether the waves or particles are real. In this case, the 
words “particle” and “wave” wouldn’t have an ontological status, but only 
an empirical one: since they are only entities entering the description of 
certain experiments. Although some kind of independent physical reality 
underlies Bohr’s interpretation7, it would be only in the sense that the 
particle/wave duality is related to the phenomena. It is not possible to 
give them some ontological status8. It is necessary, according to his view, 
to give up the causal description of the phenomena in terms of space and 
time. Although Bohr repeteadly explains that they are not contradictory 
visions, but complementary, he does not make clear in what sense they are 
possibly complementary. He just states that in their field of application 
both elementary particles and waves are in some sense real9. The principle 
of complementarity therefore could lead to an empiricist view of nature 
and science, as M. Bunge pointed out10. 
Whereas Bohr’s principle of complementarity states that the wave 
and particle modes of description are complementary models, Heisenberg 
and Pauli thought that the wave nature of matter meant nothing more 
6.  See Dirac, P.A.M.: The Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 7.
7. See Bohr, N.: La théorie atomique et la description des phénomènes. Paris: Gauthier-
Villars, 1932, pp. 49-85.
8. See Folse, H. J.: The Philosophy of Niels Bohr, the Framework of Complementarity. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985, pp. 222-223.
9. See Bohm, D.-Hiley, B. J.: The Undivided Universe. An Ontological Interpretation of 
Quantum Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 16-17.
10. See Bohr, N.: “Le postulat des quanta et le nouveau dévelppement de l’atomistique”, in: 
Électrons et photons. Rapports et discussions (Solvay 1927), Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1928, p. 244.
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than the inherently random behaviour of entities that are particles11. As 
we will see, Heisenberg introduces the concept of potentiality as a possible 
way to understand the wave function. Although it is not clear in which 
way he thinks the potentiality to be real, I want to show that a deeper 
understanding of the notion of potentiality can bring light to understand 
the quantum world12. Close to Heisenberg’s and Pauli’s view we find 
Born’s position, even though he is in favour of understanding that both 
the particle and the wave are in some sense real13. However, although 
there are still significant differencies of emphasis between these physicists 
it was clear that all of them shared a common interpretation14.
As I have previously explained, one of the main problems of 
the Copenhagen interpretation is that it can lead to an instrumental 
view of science in which quantum mechanics could be interpreted as a 
mathematical formalism that helps to make predictions, but is incapable 
of describing the physical world as it is. However, if we want to admit 
that this mathematical formalism helps to describe and understand the 
physical world, it is then necessary to provide an interpretation that 
incorporates the wave-particle duality in a realistic manner. The wave 
function must have some kind of reality if it is to truely help to make 
predictions, and in the same way the particle must be also real.
An interesting interpretation can be found in De Broglie’s pilot-wave 
theory. Although for a long time he admitted the Copenhagen interpretation 
(rejecting his previous ideas), he turned back later to a realistic way of 
understanding the waves and particles. Thus, he differentiated the ψ 
(epistemological) wave function from what he called the u-wave, which 
would be the real wave: “whilst the u-wave would be the true description 
of microparticles, the ψ-wave would be a ficticious wave with a subjective 
character but capable of supplying precise statistical information and still 
linked in some way with the u-wave”15. This ontological interpretation of 
11. “It is not merely that the doctrine of complementarity stresses the doubtless active rôle of 
the experimenter, the active side of knowledge; it goes beyond this, asserting that obervations 
are the alpha and the omega of the knowledge, that there is nothing which is being observed, 
nothing beyond observation itself”. Bunge, M.: “Strife about Complementarity” in British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6, 1955-1956, p. 3.
12. See Holton, G.: Concepts and Theories in Physical Science. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 
1973, p. 499.
13. See Bohm, D.-Hiley, B. J.: The Undivided Universe. An Ontological Interpretation of 
Quantum Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 18-19.
14. See Born, M.: Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, 
pp. 104-106.
15. See Hendry, J.: The Creation of Quantum Mechanics and the Bohr-Pauli Dialogue. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984, p. 127.
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both waves and particles has been further developed by Bohm16. However, 
once admitted that waves and particles are real, the problem would be to 
know how both of each relate to each other and, in the case of De Broglie’s 
u-wave, how it is related with the ψ function17. In any case, it seems 
necessary to establish some metaphysical comprehension of the reality of 
waves and particles.
Schrödinger took another way of interpretating quantum mechanics 
based on the priority of the wave model. He viewed his ψ wave as a 
physical wave (a real wave18), abandoning completely any idea of localizing 
the particle in this wave, and forming a picture of the atom which made 
no place for localized particles19. Thus, his conclusion is that we shouldn’t 
think that there is a “substratum” (a “material particle”) behind the atomic 
level: “It is better to regard a particle not as a permanent entity but as 
an instantaneuous event”20. In this sense, the electrons are not particles, 
but forms (waves) without materiality in the sense that they don’t have a 
specific location:
It seems almost ludicrous that precisely in the same years or decades which let us 
succeed in tracing single, individual atoms and particles, and that in various ways, 
we have yet been compelled to dismiss the idea that such a particle is an individual 
entity which in principle retains its ‘sameness’ for ever. Quite the contrary, we are 
now obliged to assert that the ultimate constituents of matter have no ‘sameness’ at 
all21.
However, Schrödinger’s interpretation seems to be a strong 
phenomenalistic position according to which what we call reality are just our 
perceptions: “That is the reality that surrounds us: some actual perceptions 
and sensations become automatically supplemented by a number of virtual 
perceptions and appear connected in independent complexes, which we 
16.  De Broglie, L.: The Current Interpretation of Wave Mechanics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
1964, pp. 38-39.
17. See Bohm, D.-Hiley, B. J.: The Undivided Universe. An Ontological Interpretation of 
Quantum Theory. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
18. For some of the problems that arise from Bohm’s interpretation see D’Espagnat, B.: On 
Physics and Philosophy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 201-206.
19. “Something that influences the physical behaviour of something else must not in any 
respect be called less real than the something it influences ‒whatever meaning we may 
give to the dangerous epithet ‘real’”. Schrödinger, E.: “What is an Elementary Particle?” in 
Schrödinger, E.: Science, Theory and Man. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957, p. 198.
20. See De Broglie, L.: “On the True Ideas Underlying Wave Mechanics” in De Broglie, 
L.:  Heisenberg’s Uncertainties and the Probabilistic Interpretation of Wave Mechanics. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990, p. xlii.
21. Schrödinger, E.: Science and Humanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 131.
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call existing objects”22. In this way, his preference for the reality of the 
waves should be understood as some version of phenomenalism23 in which 
reality (the waves) is something we cannot perceive directly, but through 
a process of “private sense-data”. Assuming that only the waves are real 
(in a very strange sense of being real), the particles would be just our way 
of perceiving the world, but not actually real. Nevertheless, Schrödinger 
philosophical statements are not clear at all, and I guess it would require 
a further development to understand them.
All these interpretations show that the questions that arise from 
quantum mechanics are not only physical problems, but also a metaphysical 
challenge24. The mathematical formalism of the wave function and several 
experiments show a counterintuitive behaviour of the elementary particles 
that seem to contradict the most basic principles of our knowledge of 
reality: that it should be determined and located in space and time.
The principle of no-contradiction, which is the basic premise of all 
science, points out that real beings are in a determined way, and not in 
two determined states at the same time. Nevertheless, what we can draw 
from Schrödinger’s equations is that the electron has not a determined 
state before we interact with it, and that the electron is in all its possible 
states (probability-wave) at the same time. Therefore, the electron is in all 
the possible states, and at the same time is not at all in any of them. The 
question that then arises is in which way we should think that this wave 
aspect is real. Here is where the Aristotelian notion of potentiality can be 
an interesting tool to understand it. Now I would like to analyze this notion 
ir order to find a metaphysical answer to the problem of indetermination 
and the possible states in the wave function.
3. Potentiality from a philosophical perspective
Heisenberg suggested in several passages of his philosophical 
writings that the Aristotelian notion of potentiality (potentia) could be 
useful to understand the problem of measurement and the wave/particle 
duality in quantum mechanics. Even though he didn’t develop much this 
approach, I would like to explore the possibility of understanding the 
wave/particle duality problem from this aristotalian notion. In Physics 
22. Schrödinger, E.: Science and Humanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, 
p. 121.
23. Schrödinger, E.: “Conceptual Models in Physics and their Philosophical Value” in Schrödinger, 
E.: Science, Theory and Man. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957, pp. 149-150.
24. See Bitbol, M.: Schrödinger’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1996, pp. 167-171.
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and Philosophy he suggests that most of the physicists regard the wave 
as some sort of potentiality, something not real at all, but as some kind of 
tendency:
One might perhaps call it an objective tendency or possibility, a ‘potentia’ in the 
sense of Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, I believe that the language actually used by 
physicists when they speak about atomic events produces in their minds similar no-
tions as the concept ‘potentia’. So the physicists have gradually become accustomed to 
considering the electronic orbits, etc., not as reality but rather as a kind of ‘potentia’25.
The main question, then, would be to understand how we could 
consider the electronic orbits as not real, but just as possible tendencies. 
From a philosophical point of view this kind of “existence” or “possibility” 
should be clarified, because as Heisenberg also states:
The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater… was a quantitative version of 
the old concept of “potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something stan-
ding in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind 
of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality 26.
The only way of interpretating the wave function in a realistic way 
is by trying to understand a sort of reality that is not real at all, but just 
possible (or, we might say, a “real possibility”). In some sense the wave 
function is a wave of probability, but in another sense it is something real 
because it describes a real state of different possible states at the same 
time (superposition of states). The notion of “potentiality”, as something 
intermediate between non-being and what is actual, seems to describe 
precisely the possible states in the wave function.
However, this Aristotelian notion of potentiality needs some 
clarification. For this reason it might be helpful to analyze some of 
Aristoteles’ statements in books Θ and Λ of his Metaphysics. However, it is 
not the purpose of this essay to deal with possible problems of interpretation 
of this concept, but rather to grasp the main characteristics of this notion 
and then try to see if it could be helpful to understand quantum reality.
Aristotle develops his philosophy of potentiality in order to solve 
the problem of the sensible substance. One of the central questions of the 
ancient Greek philosophers was to know if we could say that the world 
we are living in is something ‘real’. The great metaphysician Parmenides 
argued that taken the notion of ‘being’ seriously, it would be impossible 
to say that a world of change and motion could be said to be real: the 
world could be an appearance, but not something real. According to 
25. Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1982 (1956), pp. 199-200.
26. Heisenberg, W.: Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007, pp. 154-155.
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his metaphysical argumentation, there could only be one perfect being, 
without change or motion27, because if there is change, there is some king 
of non-being state (for example, if the plant grows it is because it ‘is not’ 
completed at all). Aristotle tries to explain, against the strong parmenidian 
notion of being, that we can talk about being in different ways, that is, 
that there are different ways of using the word ‘being’. Aristotle introduces 
his act and potentiality distinction in order to explain the way in which 
changes and motions of the world can be said to be real and also to explain 
one of the main characteristics of the physical world: that it is opened to 
new actualizations. In doing so in the Metaphysics, he argues against the 
strong Parmenidian vision of the world defended by the Megarian school, 
which denied all change and motion.
“There are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’ (to on 
legetai pollachos, Met. 1028 a)”28. The first sense of being is the substance 
(ousia), taken as that what is subsistent along the time. We say that 
something is real because it is stable (and we could also say, because it 
is well defined in space and time). For this reason Aristotle says that we 
can say that bodies are substances, are real, because they are stable and 
well defined by their essence. The verb ‘to be’ must be applied first of all to 
this notion of substance, and therefore to other categories of being that are 
referred to the substance: “For it is in virtue of the concept of substance 
that the others also are said to be […]. And since ‘being’ (to on) is in one 
way distinguished into individual thing, quality and quantity, and is in 
another way distinguished in respect of potency (dunamis) and complete 
reality (energeia), and of function (Met. 1045 b)”.
The primary sense of being must be applied to the substance, al-
though it is possible to use the word ‘being’ in a different way when it is 
referred to what is actual or just potential. Aristotle develops this notion 
of potentiality as a way of explaining how it is possible that things that are 
real change in different ways, whereas that change is something also real. 
Aristotle defines potency as “a source of movement or change, which is in 
another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other (Met. 
1019 a 15)”. The potency is the source of the movement because it brings a 
real capacity of actualization. It is a real capacity as a range of possibilities 
that can be actualized in only one way. For example, the healthy boy has 
the capacity of running, walking or cycling, but he is able to do just one 
activity at the same time. But, on the other hand, those possible activities 
are real possibilities grounded on the fact that the boy has healthy legs. 
Because the boy has a real potency of running, walking, cycling and so on, 
27. Heisenberg, W.: Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007, p. 15.
28. See Diels, H.-Kranz, W.: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin, 1954, 18 B 6.
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he is able to perform all those activities, but it will be impossible for him to 
perform all at the same time. When he is walking, he is not cycling.
For this reason Aristotle links the notion of potentiality with some 
kind of indetermination: “That which exists potentially and not in com-
plete reality that is indeterminate (aoristos) (Met. 1007 b 27)”. Precisely 
because the potentiality is open to different actualizations, it is indetermi-
ned. Because the boy has healthy legs he has the capacity of performing 
different activities, but the fact of having legs (which is a real potentiality) 
does not determine him to do only one of them. That potentiality will be 
determined in some direction when the boy decides what to do with his 
legs and reaches some actualization.
The wave function could be undestood as some kind of potentiality 
in the sense that it is a source of movement and change (possible states) of 
the electron: the source of possible actualizations of the electron. This wave 
of possible actualizations is real in the sense that they are possible states 
with real effectiveness in the electron behaviour, although those possible 
states are being actualized in a determined way. The physical world is in 
some way actually determined, and that means that our knowledge of it 
will always be in a determined temporal and spatial position. Before the 
experiment the electron is in a state of potentiality towards its energetic 
manifestation. The wave function would express then the inherent poten-
tiality of the quantum world.
According to Aristotle the potentiality is real, but not by itself: it 
needs a real subject or substance in which it can exist. For example, the 
potency of moving does not exist by itself, it exists in a real subject (the 
boy) that has that potency. However, the potency is real in the sense that 
it is a real property of potentiality (possibilites) that exists in a real sub-
ject. In this case the actual substance would be the electron (as a particle): 
before the measure there is a range spectrum of possibilities determined 
by the wave function. In this sense it would be easy to understand that the 
physical reality is not determined in a fixed way, because the potentiality 
we find in the quantum world provides the physical reality a range of pos-
sibilities without an absolute determination.
Moreover, it should be noticed that the wave function as potentia-
lity should be understood in an active sense. The wave function is not the 
actual, but the potential: a sort of potentiality that tends to a proper ac-
tualization (See Met. 1021 a 15). But, as Aristotle notices, the potentiality 
only gets into the actual when something in act brings about the actualiza-
tion. It would make sense, then, that we find the electron as a particle only 
in the energetic exchange, because it is when the exchange happens that 
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something in act from outside brings the potentiality of the wave function 
into a determined actuality.
4. Heisenberg’s use of the concept of potentiality
Having sketched the main features of the Aristotelian notion of po-
tentiality, I will return to some of Heisenberg considerations and see how 
these notions can be applied to quantum mechanics. It must be noticed, 
however, that Heisenberg does not seem to apply this notion always in the 
same way: some times he follows a more realistic approach, while other 
times he seems to be close to a subjectivist view of the problem of measure-
ment. We find a more realistic approach when he speaks of the probability 
as some kind of “objective reality”:
“The most important of these [features of interpretation] was the 
introduction of the probability as a new kind of ‘objective’ physical reality. 
This probability concept is closely related to the concept of possibility, the 
‘potentia’ of the natural philosophy of the ancients such as Aristotle; it is, 
to a certain extent, a transformation of the old ‘potentia’ concept from a 
qualitative to a quantitave idea”29.
Heisenberg points out rightly that this interpretation of the pro-
bability in the wave function leads to a mathematical characterization of 
the concept of potentiality. The capacity of possible states has some kind of 
determination that is described precisely by the wave function in a mathe-
matical way is expressed more precisely in the later text of Heisenberg’s:
The criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum theory rests quite 
generally on the anxiety that, with this interpretation, the concept of ‘objective rea-
lity’ which forms the basis of classical physics might be driven out of physics. As we 
have here exhaustively shown, this anxiety is groundless, since the ‘actual’ plays the 
same decisive part in quantum theory as it does in classical physics. The Copenhagen 
interpretation is indeed based upon the existence of processes which can be simply 
described in terms of space and time, i.e. in terms of classical concepts, and which 
thus compose our ‘reality’ in the proper sense. If we attempt to penetrate behind this 
reality into the details of atomic events, the contours of this ‘objectively real’ would 
dissolve ‒not in the midst of a new and yet unclear idea of reality, but in the trans-
parent clarity of a mathematics whose laws govern the possible and not the actual30.
We are before a very interesting text that shows Heisenberg’s phi-
losophical position in regard to quantum physics. On the one hand, there 
is some approximation to Aristotle’s notion of potentiality as a main cha-
29. Heisenberg, W.: “The Development of the Interpretation of the Quantum Theory” in 
Pauli, W.: Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics. Oxford: Pergamon, 1962, pp. 12-13.
30. Heisenberg, W.: “The Development of the Interpretation of the Quantum Theory” in 
Pauli, W.: Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics. Oxford: Pergamon, 1962, p. 28.
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racteristic of the physical world, while on the other hand this potentiality 
reveals itself as a mathematical law that ‘governs the possible’. In this 
sense, there is a curious mixture of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy 
in his interpretation. However, the most interesting point of Heisenberg’s 
statements lies in the link established between the notion of potentiality, 
as a source of indetermination, and the mathematical laws that rule that 
potentiality, as a source of knowledge of which way it can be determined. 
Returning to the example of the boy, the fact of having healthy legs gives 
him the capacity (potentiality) of doing different things but, on the other 
hand, his possibilities are restricted: he can walk, run, ride a bike, but he 
cannot fly. The potentiality is a source of indetermination directed towards 
determined actualizations. In this sense, the mathematical formalism des-
cribes the precise possible actualizations.
It must be noticed, nevertheless, that Heisenberg does not use this 
notion of potentiality always in the same sense. The potentiality/actuality 
description of the quantum world appears in his writings in some occa-
sions as referred to the role of the observation and the collapse of the wave 
function:
Therefore, the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place during the 
act of observation. If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have 
to realize that the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the observation, not to the state 
of affairs between two observations. It applies to the physical, not the psychical act 
of observation, and we may say that the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ 
takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the measuring device, and 
thereby with the reast of the world, has come into play: it is connected with the act 
of registration of the result by the mind of the observer. The discontinuous change of 
our knowledge in the instant of registration that has its image in the discontinuous 
change of the probability function31.
Whereas the wave function shows a probability of possible sta-
tes, the fact of measuring makes a discontinuous change in that function, 
which is our actual and determined result in the experiment. It could seem 
that here “possible” and “actual” are referred just to our state of knowledge 
(probable/real), but I suppose that it could be possible to relate them to 
some intrinsic properties of reality. The “potential” and the “actual” are 
degrees of reality grounded on some kind of being, not just different kinds 
of knowledge.
In any case, from these statementes it is easy to understand why 
Heisenberg’s position has often been interpreted as close to subjectivism. 
Some of his statements can be misleading, such as when he says: “The 
31. Heisenberg, W.: Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007, pp. 28-29.
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electron path comes only into existence only when we observe it”32. Ob-
viously the word “observing” can bring about confussion: it should not be 
understood as the subjective act of observing, but as the objective and real 
interaction that happens between the studied electron and the instrument 
of measurement. The “observation” is the experiment33 that modifies the 
electron. It is due to this reason why Heisenberg can say that the electron 
path comes into existence when we observe it. Before any observation the-
re is no energetic change, and the electron remains in its superposition of 
states, described by the wave function. Heisenberg’s interpretation is a re-
alistic position, though rather that a subjectivist one34. However, it seems 
that Heisenberg description of the wave function in terms of potentiality 
is an idea that he did not develop extensively35. 
5. Matter as source of indetermination
Quantum mechanics has offered us a way of understanding nature, 
and more precisely matter, as a source of indetermination in a very similar 
way as Aristotle defined the natural substance as composed by matter and 
form (potentiality and actuality). Matter in the aristotelian framework is 
precisely a principle or source of indetermination in nature:
By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain 
quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined 
(Met.1029 a 20).
Aristotle defines matter as a basic substratum of reality, indeter-
mined in itself as a principle of nature, although always determined actua-
lly with a specific form. Obviously we do not find this ‘prime matter’, and 
Aristotle would say that it is not real in itself, but only real as a basic prin-
ciple inherent to the physical objects of the world. In other words: Aristotle 
notices that there is a principle of potentiality and indetermination in the 
physical world that allows something to change and to become something 
different than what it actually is. We find examples of this everywhere 
32. Heisenberg, W.: “Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik 
und Mechanik” in Zeitschrift für Physik 43, 1927, p. 185.
33. See Heisenberg, W.: Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007, p. 19.
34. See Hendry, J.: The Creation of Quantum Mechanics and the Bohr-Pauli Dialogue. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984, p. 129.
35. Popper critizes Heisenberg precisely because after saying that the aristotelian potentiality 
could be useful to understand the wave function, he then goes on with the problem of the 
role of the observer and the problem of measurement introducing subjetivist elements in 
the interpretation. See Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, Totowa: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 (1956), pp. 132-133.
in nature: a stone is actually real, but there is a principle in the stone by 
which it can be turned into something else (a statue, dust, etc.): “All things 
produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capa-
ble both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each 
(Met. 1032 a 20)”.
Matter is the inner capacity of every physical object of being or not 
being in a determined way. Matter is, in this sense, a principle a potentia-
lity, just in the same way that the wave aspect of the electron is a source 
of possibilities and indetermination. If there is something that quatum 
mechanics has demonstrated in the last decades, it is the indetermined 
and potential character that appears in the most fundamental structures 
of the physical world. We find within the inner structure of matter a prin-
ciple of indetermination and potentiality: possible actualizations grounded 
in the reality of the atom: that is what Aristotle would have called “poten-
tialities”, and what Popper calls “propensities”. Which kind of reality do 
these potentialities have? Can we say that they are real in the same way 
that we say a house (located in a defined space and time) is real? This is 
not obviously the case, but it would make no sense to say that they are not, 
in some sense, real. They are real potentialities with real effectiveness, 
although this effectiveness is only revealed in its actual manifestations 
as particles. This notion of matter fits properly with the superposition of 
states of the wave function. As Aristotle says:
The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states. And since that 
which ‘is’ has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is 
potentially to that which is actually, for example from potentially white to actually 
white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution (Met. 1069 b 14-20)
Matter is the potentiality of being two states, not at the same time, 
but as real possibilites that can become into the actual. It is because there 
is some source of indetermination and potentiality that things can become 
different from what they are, in as much as this potentiality is something 
real as potentiality: “The matter is that which is potentially each thing 
(Met. 1092 a 3). In other words: the most basic feature of matter (of being 
material) is the potentiality to become something else, to receive a diffe-
rent specific form:
Sensible substance is changeable. Now if change proceeds from opposites as from 
intermediates […] there must be something underlying which changes into the con-
trary state; for the contraries do not change. Further, something persists, but the 
contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, the 
matter (Met. 1069 b 1-8)
If natural things change from one state to another it must be due 
to a principle intrinsic to them that makes them changeable, that is to say, 
which gives them the potentiality of becoming something or in some aspect 
different of what they are. In this sense, it can be interesting to consider one of 
Heisenberg’s statements concerning the way in which the notion of matter as 
a principle of potentiality can be applied to quantum physics:
Actually the experiments have shown the complete mutability of matter. All the ele-
mentary particles can, at sufficiently high energies, be transmuted into other particles, 
or they can simply be created from kinetic energy and can be annihilated into energy, for 
instance into radiation. Therefore, we have here actually the final proof for the unity of 
matter. All the elementary particles are made of the same substance, which we may call 
energy or universal matter; they are just different forms in which matter can appear. If 
we compare this situation with the Aristotelian concepts of matter and form, we can say 
that the matter of Aristotle, which is mere ‘potentia’, should be compared to our concept 
of energy, which gets into actuality by means of the form, when the elementary particle is 
created36.
Heisenberg points out that this prime matter can be considered as 
energy that capable of being transformed and specified in different ways. I 
think that Aristotle’s concept of matter as a principle of potentiality can help to 
understand better some of the problems of interpretation of the wave function. 
It must be noticed, however, that this principle of potentiality and indetermi-
nation has to be adapted when applied to the wave function. In fact, there is 
no total indetermination in the wave function, but rather this superposition of 
states is described through mathematical formalities which indicate some kind 
of determination.
6. Popper’s propensities as potentialities
The application of this notion of potentiality to quantum physics has 
also been defended in a slightly different way by Popper. Although Popper 
is opposed to Aristotelian metaphysics, which he views as “essentialist”37, he 
offers an indeterministic interpretation not only of quantum mechanics, but 
also of classical physics, understanding by indeterminism “a doctrine asserting 
that not all events are ‘determined in every detail’”38. In this sense, he does not 
36.  Heisenberg, W.: Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007, p. 134.
37. Popper, K,: The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. I. The Spell of Plato. London: Routledge, 
1945, p. 25.
38. Popper, K.: “Indeterminism in Quantum Physics” in British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 1, 1950, p. 120.
state that everything in nature is indetermined, but rather that there can be 
some events that are not completely determined.
In fact, Popper’s indeterministic view is a realistic interpretation of 
quantum mechanics in which he defines the probabilistic character of the wave 
function as something real, precisely in what he calls “propensities”.
“I believe that the quantum theory is in a very definite sense a particle 
theory (here I disagree with Schrödinger) and in a sense which excludes a dua-
lity, or analogy, or complementarity, between particles and waves. To be more 
explicit, I believe that the waves (even those of the second quantization) are 
mathematical representations of propensities, or of dispositional properties, 
of the physical situation (such as the experimental set-up), interpretable as 
propensities of the particles to take up certain states”39. 
Popper develops a realistic view of quantum mechanics: particles are 
real, and the formalism of the equations describes possible values of the varia-
bles of the system:
The particles do not appear, explicitly, in the formalism ‒neither in the wave forma-
lism, nor in the matrix formalism (…). All these theories describe the propensities of cer-
tain variables to take up certain values; variables that may be interpreted as variables of 
the state of certain particles40.
The theory, then, describes some relational values as possible states41. 
But what are, then, the waves described by the formalism? Are they something 
real? Popper states that they must be understood as something real in the sen-
se that they are propensities of the system: real relational properties that can 
be measured as possibilities. In this sense, I think that Popper’s philosophy of 
propensities does not differ too much from the use that Heisenberg makes of 
potentialities, but here we find a more developed metaphysical account in a 
clear realistic way.
Popper’s account of propensities integrates the wave function into the 
realm of reality as a real possible range of states and values of the electron. 
But, which kind of reality are these propensities? They are real in as much as 
39. Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 
(1956), p. 126.
40. Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 
(1956), p. 127.
41. In fact, it seems that the formalism of the theory does not have a descriptive character, but 
rather a dispositional one: it calculates the disposition of the system to show certain values. See 
Hughes, R. I. G.: The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Harvard 
Univesity Press, 1989, pp. 68-69. 
they are real possibilities, which, as far as I can see, is the same as to say that 
they are potentialities in the way described by Aristotle:
We thus obtain a picture of the world which is at once dualistic and monistic. It is dua-
listic in that the potentialities are potentialities only relative to their possible realizations 
or actualizations; and it is monistic in that the realizations or actualizations not only deter-
mine potentialities, but may even be said to be potentialities themselves. (But we should 
perhaps avoid saying that they are ‘nothing but’ potentialities). Thus we may describe the 
physical world as consisting of changing propensities for change42.
Both Heisenberg and Popper understand that there is some kind of 
potentiality inherent to the quantum world. Heisenberg speaks of this poten-
tiality as “the possible”, whereas Popper’s doctrine of “propensities” seems to 
attribute a more physical reality to this potentiality. In fact, Heisenberg’s dis-
tinction between the possible (potentiality) and the real (actuality) can lead to 
a subjectivistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. The fact that the inhe-
rent potentiality of the quantum world is described in terms of mathematical 
wave functions is seen by him as a victory of the platonic philosophy (geometri-
cal description of the world) over the materialistic and deterministic vision43.
7. Chance and indetermination
One of the main problems for accepting the probabilistic account of the 
wave function is that it seems to bring chance into the physical world. Precise-
ly because there is not a deterministic causal connection between the possible 
states that describe the wave function and the actual state that appears in the 
measurement process, it would seem that it is a mere question of chance that 
the electron behaves in one or onother way.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be accurate with the terms “chance” and 
“indetermination” in order to avoid misinterpretations. By the word “chance” 
we understand something that is opposed to “causality”, complete randomness. 
It is clear that there is not such complete randomness in quantum mechanics, 
and it would be inappropriate to say that there is chance. In fact, if there is 
chance one would have to hold that it is governed by some rules44, so it would 
42. Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 
(1956), p. 160.
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be better therefore just to speak of some kind of indetermination in the way 
matter obeys these rules. In this sense, there is causality in quantum mecha-
nics, although not absolute determination.
Aristotle’s concept of matter as a principle of potentiality did not refer 
to a physical sense of indetermination, but was rather a metaphysical tool 
used to explain why every material object can become something different from 
that what it actually is: there must be a principle which is not completely de-
termined by the actual form. One could think, however, that this concept of 
matter as a principle of indetermination could have a physical ground based 
on the fact that there is some indetermination in the behaviour of the quantum 
particles. In this sense, it would be possible to say that main feature of being 
material is precisely not being at all determined. I think that Popper’s account 
on propensities arrives at a similar solution which allows an understanding of 
how indetermination fits in a real world of potentialities:
The tendency of statistical averages to remain stable if the conditions remain stable is 
one of the msot remarkable characteristics of our universe. It can be explained, I hold, only 
by the propensity theory; by the theory that there exist weighted possibilities which are 
more than mere possibilities, but tendencies or propensities to become real: tendencies or 
propensities to realize themselves which are inherent in all possibilities in various degrees 
and which are something like forces that keep statistics stable. This is an objective inter-
pretation of the theory of probability. Propensities, it is assumed, are not mere possibilities 
but are physical realities. They are as real as forces, or fields of forces45.
Thus, the wave function could be interpreted from a philosophical point 
of view as the mathematical configuration of the proper potentialities of the 
electron. Actual reality is always presented to the human mind in a deter-
mined space-time configuration. In this sense, it is not possible to imagine 
how the wave function is determined in a normal space-time configuration, 
because it is just a source of potentialities that only becomes actual with some 
kind of energetic manifestation. While electrons become actual in their ener-
getic manifestations, it should be interpreted as an indetermined potentiality 
before any exchange of energy takes place. It should be added, nevertheless, 
that there is no complete indermination, because it is configured through the 
mathematical formalism of the wave function. While on the one hand it is 
a potentiality determined by possible configurations, on the other hand it is 
indetermined and open to different actualizations. At this point I agree with 
Popper’s account of the propensities: “In the terminology of Aristotle we might 
45. Popper, K.: A World of Propensities. Bristol: Thoemes, 1990, p. 12.
say: ‘To be is both to be the actualization of a prior propensity to become, and 
to be a propensity to become’”46.
8. Conclusions
In the previous pages I have tried to offer a realistic account of 
quantum mechanics based on metaphysical notions developed by Aristotle in 
connection with Heisenberg’s and Popper’s views. It should be noted however 
that Heisenberg’s and Popper’s views of the natural world are quite far away 
from Aristotle: the main reason is because their main goal is to overcome the 
Newtonian physical deterministic model, and they do it from the discoveries 
of the quantum world. Even though, I have tried to show how the Aristotelian 
notion of potentiality seems to be in agreement at some points with these 
thinkers. With this interpretation I am not offering a scientific tool, but rather 
a more comprehensive approach in order to understand what is nature. I think 
that these kinds of comprehensive approaches are necessary if we want to admit 
that science describes something real about the world. Quantum mechanics 
has offered us a mathematical formalism to describe the main structures of 
matter. Beyond the questions raised it also shows us that in the depths of the 
atom matter is revealed as a source of indetermination and potentiality. The 
philosophical problems that arise from quantum mechanics force us to look 
for ways of understanding in which way can we say that the particles and the 
waves are real. Perhaps, what quantum mechanics has shown to philosophy is 
that the old Greek questions related to change and stability remain unsolved.
46. Popper, K.: Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 
(1956), p. 205.

